Phillip S. Klein: President James Buchanan: A Biography
James Buchanan: 15th President (1857-1861); b. 1791; d. 1868
Klein's book is actually very good. It's very well-paced, interesting, well-written, all the things one would expect from a good presidential biography. Klein really digs into a lot of primary source material--including many of Buchanan's own papers--to bring out details of a number of life-changing (and history-changing) events in Buchanan's life.
The weakness in Klein's book is that, at times, be becomes too much of a cheerleader for Buchanan. Klein appears to accept that Buchanan's pursuit of his own political goals is itself a good, and this lets him justify a number of Buchanan's questionable decisions as good politics--Buchanan's vacillation on tariff policy to appease Pennsylvanians becomes wholly acceptable. Klein also too readily accepts Buchanan's stated belief in a limited executive as a justification for his undermining Polk and his failure to respond to the Succession Crisis. Lots of other presidents who stated such views--Jackson and Jefferson are two examples--took swift and decisive action when it was in the national interest. Buchanan's decision to cling to these ideas when they put the future of his country at stake may have made him a tragic figure, rather than a nefarious one. But it surely didn't make him a hero.
Bachelor President: This is, of course, something that's commonly noted about Buchanan. And I think it says something about the country that he remains the only bachelor president. Klein paints a compelling portrait of Buchanan the man, and a number of instances we can see Buchanan latching onto male friends in a way that we may not see among married men (this is, perhaps, similar to the bonds formed 50 or 75 years earlier by men like Adams leaving their wives and traveling abroad in national service). I think, again, he most resembles Van Buren, who was widowed early and spent his later years attracting feminine attention. Both men were described as handsome and well dressed, although the plain-dressing Buchanan would contrast with the dandyish Van Buren. This fact adds a little color to his character--the lack of which is painfully obvious in so many contemporary politicians.
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Regarding women, the tragic love story of his you is heartbreaking--you really feel for this guy and his fiancée (although, his refusal to take decisive action to preserve a bond worth saving perhaps foreshadows 1860-61--I can't be the only person to have thought that). And the scenes of apparent disappointment when, even as a rather aged gentlemen, romantic hopes do not come to fruition are poignant.
Living History: One thing I enjoyed when reading about Buchanan was the re-telling of much of the history of his era. Buchanan was active as a national politician for a long time (dates). And because of his skill he quickly rose to prominence. His interactions with Jackson were scandalous, and during his time in the Senate he spared with Clay and Calhoun and (more).
Buchanan and Polk: One period of notable interest was his time as as Polk's Secretary of State. Polk was an asshole when he was in Polk's cabinet, and he was at times willingly obstructionists when he thought it would further his own political aims (always at Polk's expense). Polk took aggressive stances with the British on the Oregon question as a way to push the envelope and get a resolution. Buchanan immediately favored friendly negotiations aimed at seeking compromise, oblivious to the fact that positional negotiation does not work that way (this is, again, reminiscent of Buchanan's failed attempts to placate South Carolina in 1860). When Polk went as far as he could go, and was ready to settle the issue, Buchanan reversed his position and said he didn't want to back down. Klein described this as Buchanan "giving Polk some of his own medicine." This is crap. Polk's aggressive stances on Texas and Oregon turned into spectacular gains for the US, and Buchanan tried to sabotage that because he didn't have the stomach to play the game Polk was playing.
The weakness in Klein's book is that, at times, be becomes too much of a cheerleader for Buchanan. Klein appears to accept that Buchanan's pursuit of his own political goals is itself a good, and this lets him justify a number of Buchanan's questionable decisions as good politics--Buchanan's vacillation on tariff policy to appease Pennsylvanians becomes wholly acceptable. Klein also too readily accepts Buchanan's stated belief in a limited executive as a justification for his undermining Polk and his failure to respond to the Succession Crisis. Lots of other presidents who stated such views--Jackson and Jefferson are two examples--took swift and decisive action when it was in the national interest. Buchanan's decision to cling to these ideas when they put the future of his country at stake may have made him a tragic figure, rather than a nefarious one. But it surely didn't make him a hero.
Bachelor President: This is, of course, something that's commonly noted about Buchanan. And I think it says something about the country that he remains the only bachelor president. Klein paints a compelling portrait of Buchanan the man, and a number of instances we can see Buchanan latching onto male friends in a way that we may not see among married men (this is, perhaps, similar to the bonds formed 50 or 75 years earlier by men like Adams leaving their wives and traveling abroad in national service). I think, again, he most resembles Van Buren, who was widowed early and spent his later years attracting feminine attention. Both men were described as handsome and well dressed, although the plain-dressing Buchanan would contrast with the dandyish Van Buren. This fact adds a little color to his character--the lack of which is painfully obvious in so many contemporary politicians.
and
Regarding women, the tragic love story of his you is heartbreaking--you really feel for this guy and his fiancée (although, his refusal to take decisive action to preserve a bond worth saving perhaps foreshadows 1860-61--I can't be the only person to have thought that). And the scenes of apparent disappointment when, even as a rather aged gentlemen, romantic hopes do not come to fruition are poignant.
Living History: One thing I enjoyed when reading about Buchanan was the re-telling of much of the history of his era. Buchanan was active as a national politician for a long time (dates). And because of his skill he quickly rose to prominence. His interactions with Jackson were scandalous, and during his time in the Senate he spared with Clay and Calhoun and (more).
Buchanan and Polk: One period of notable interest was his time as as Polk's Secretary of State. Polk was an asshole when he was in Polk's cabinet, and he was at times willingly obstructionists when he thought it would further his own political aims (always at Polk's expense). Polk took aggressive stances with the British on the Oregon question as a way to push the envelope and get a resolution. Buchanan immediately favored friendly negotiations aimed at seeking compromise, oblivious to the fact that positional negotiation does not work that way (this is, again, reminiscent of Buchanan's failed attempts to placate South Carolina in 1860). When Polk went as far as he could go, and was ready to settle the issue, Buchanan reversed his position and said he didn't want to back down. Klein described this as Buchanan "giving Polk some of his own medicine." This is crap. Polk's aggressive stances on Texas and Oregon turned into spectacular gains for the US, and Buchanan tried to sabotage that because he didn't have the stomach to play the game Polk was playing.
Van Buren, the Sequel: What’s immediately apparent about Buchanan’s career is it’s similarity to Martin Van Buren’s. These two men were both successful attorneys from somewhat humble origins (I’d say that both of their fathers would be solidly middle class if translated to today) without any military background who committed themselves to politics. And not just politics—these men were committed to Democratic party politics, with its commitment to patronage, strict construction of the constitution, and a significant friction with New Englanders and the Whigs. Van Buren was about 10 years older than Buchanan, and his presidency—coming after Andrew Jackson but before James Polk—was really a part of a different era. Given these similarities, it’s unsurprising that they both responded to national emergencies (Van Buren to the Panic of 1837, Buchanan to the Secession Crisis) in wholly unsatisfactory ways. Both, believing in a limited executive and unwilling to truly rock the boat of Democratic politics, provided what I think are correctly seen as limited and muted responses to crises that called for a significantly more vigorous response.
JB: Handsom Devil (just like our man Van)
Secession Crisis: The way in which a president responds to crisis is often the characteristic that defines his presidency. Washington was measured and mature in cries for action again England or France (ah Citizen Genet, by 1861 it’s as if you’re from another planet). Adams stubbornly (and perhaps crabbily) insisted on peace when others were clamoring for war. Madison panicked and essentially seized up in the face of invasion in 1814.FN1 Jackson basically intimidated and shamed the secessionists of the early 1830s into silence. Van Buren and Buchanan wrote speeches and introduced legislation, leaving the nation scrambling for more effective leadership. The results achieved couldn’t be more different.
Buchanan really comes across as a tragic figure, especially in regards to the secession crisis. Klein does a very creditable job explaining and defending Buchanan’s arguments based on the politics of the day. But it truly seems that Buchanan’s devotion to certain principles—especially his unwillingness to take any military action without the express authorization of congress—that weakened him at a time when more leadership was necessary. Klein explains in a number of instances that Buchanan attempted to move congress into action (and very fairly points out that a number of the criticisms of Buchanan faulted him for the failure to do what he asked congress to do). But Buchanan has to take some of the fault for congress’s failures here.
If Buchanan, a northern moderate, acutely understood the difficulties and risks presented by the secession crisis (and Klein thinks, as a result of his many decades in national politics he understood the situation much better than Lincoln, who stayed and home in Illinois and stayed mute until February, 1861), then he should have done more. I get that Buchanan believed in a limited executive. But there was nothing stopping Buchanan from going to individual congressmen and convincing people, twisting arms, and making deals to try to resolve the crisis. Throughout the book Buchanan comes across as charming and as a political wizard. It stands to reason that if he had put his powers to full use in fall 1860 through spring 1861 he could have achieved something. And the idea that he didn’t want to do anything because he didn’t want to upstage Lincoln is a non-started—if he had attempted more decisive action, it would have fallen to the Republicans to either participate or (as they actually did with his legislative proposals) obstruct. He was a conventional politician in an unconventional time.
Fort Sumter (The place to be in 1861)
In the end, though, you can't help but feel bad for the abuse the poor guy took. He could have--should have--done better in 1860-61, but secession wasn't his fault and he certainly didn't cause the Civil War.
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FN1. The more I contemplate 1814, the more it becomes comparable to George W. Bush’s inability to handle the insurgency in Iraq. Both men were surrounded by other clamoring for war that could have otherwise been avoided. Both took the country into war unprepared and delusional about their chances of success. And while the insurgents didn’t burn down the White House, we’ve been in Iraq for over 8 years now, and like the war of 1812 people are still not sure how this all happened.
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